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Abstract
How could  scholars  survive  in  a  copy-friendly  environment  jeopardizing  the 
established  system  of  scholarly  publishing  in  which  scientific  publishers 
seemed to be authors' best friends? A backward itinerary across three German 
Enlightenment  thinkers  who  took  part  to  the  debate  on  (unauthorized) 
reprinting shows us ways – usual and unusual - in which culture can flourish in 
a copy-friendly environment.  While Fichte endorsed an intellectual property 
theory, took the function of publishers for granted and neglected the interests 
of the public, Kant saw authors as speakers and justified publishers' rights only 
as long as they work as spokespersons helping writers  to reach the public. 
Eventually  Lessing's  project  was  designed  to  foster  authors'  autonomy  by 
means of a subscription system that could have worked only on the basis of a 
free information flow and of direct relationships with and within the public itself. 
Such a condition can be compared with the situation of ancient auctores, with 
one difference:  while the ancient communities of  knowledge were educated 
minorities, because of the limitations of orality and manuscript media system, 
we have now the opportunity to take Enlightenment seriously.
Introduction
The Web started life as an attempt to get people to change their behaviour in an 
important way. Many people create documents, but pre-Web the assumption was 
that a document was the private property of its creator, and a decision to publish 
was his or hers alone. Furthermore, the technology to allow people to publish and 
disseminate documents cheaply and easily was lacking. The Web’s aim was to 
alter that behaviour radically and provide the technology to do it: people would 
make  their  documents  available  to  others  by  adding  links  to  make  them 
accessible by link following. The rapid growth of the Web, and the way in which 
this change was quickly adopted in all sectors of Western society have perhaps 
obscured the radicalism of this step.1
The Web, according to its creator, Tim Berners-Lee, is not only a technology 
enabling writers to publish and disseminate documents in a cheap and easy 
1T. Berners-Lee, W. Hall, J.A. Hendler, K. O'Hara, N. Shadbolt, D. J.  Weitzner, A framework for 
web science. Foundations and Trends in Web Science, 1 (1), 2006, pp. 17-18 (italics added).
way: it is also a way to share and to connect documents and to make them 
accessible and searchable by following their links. The age of printing and of 
intellectual  privilege2 has accustomed us to think books as separated units3 
and authors as creative individuals  outstanding the others because of  their 
scientific or literary originality. The web, on the other hand, suggests us the 
pattern  of  a  knowledge  system  as  an  interlinked  public  space  in  which 
documents and data go beyond themselves to become part of a huge, although 
fragmented,4 hypertext. 
Unfortunately,  the  pattern  of  the  web  as  a  public  hypertext  woven  by  a 
collective work clashes with our current  scholarly  publishing and evaluating 
system,  which  is  a  by-product  of  the  age  of  printing  and  of  intellectual 
privilege. When – in the early modernity - the Royal Society and its journal, the 
Philosophical Transactions, invented the scholarly publishing system, they had 
to  cope  with  a  world  that  was  dominated  both  by  censorship,  intellectual 
privilege and monopoly and, as their shadow, by unauthorized books reprinting 
and altering. 
Whatever their specific methodological approaches, histories of science dealing 
with this period always cite these achievements as occurring against an assumed 
background of an ordered, epistemologically neutral print culture, which provided 
no serious resistance to the virtuosi's efforts. Such an environment, needless to 
say, did not exist. The Society had to work to create it. Moreover, the problems 
attendant upon the print culture that  did obtain meant that within the Society, 
too, virtuosi needed to be very careful of the criteria by which they assessed 
incoming works, be they printed or manuscript.5
The result of their endeavor was a system based on:
1. a  selection (peer review) before the printing process
2. a publishing process so intertwined with the selection that its primary goal 
shifted  from  the  communication  of  results  and  ideas  to  the  bestowing  of 
scientific excellence brands. 6
The current serial prices crisis is a paradoxical consequence of this overlapping 
of  research  communication  and  evaluation.  As  the  average  cost  per  page 
published has been declining, the prices have risen well  above the inflation 
rate.7 The explanation for such a phenomenon is the oligopoly of the so-called 
core journals: if some journals are deemed essential because of their branding 
power,  the university libraries are forced to purchase them in spite of their 
2T.W. Bell suggests to rephrase the wording “intellectual property” as “intellectual privilege”, to 
avoid  people  get  accustomed  to  the  idea  that  copyright  is  not  a  temporary,  statutory 
concession  but  a  true  private  property.  See  Intellectual  Privilege:  A  Libertarian  View  of  
Copyright, 2009 http://www.intellectualprivilege.com/book.html .
3K.  Fitzpatrick,  Scholarly  Publishing  in  the  Age  of  Internet,  2007, 
http://mediacommons.futureofthebook.org/mcpress/scholarlypublishing/.
4See  for  instance  the  chart  of  the  web  in  A.Broder,  R.Kumar,  F.Maghoul,  P.  Raghavan,  S. 
Rajagopalan, R. Stata, A. Tomkins, J. Wiener,Graph structure in the web, in Ninth Interantional 
Wordl Wide Web conference, 2009,  http://www9.org/w9cdrom/160/160.html. 
5A. Johns, The Nature of the Book. Print and Knowledge in the Making, Chicago, University of 
Chicago Press, 1998, p. 466
6J.-C. Guédon,  In Oldenburg’s Long Shadow: Librarians, Research Scientists, Publishers, and  
the  Control  of  Scientific  Publishing, ARL  Publication,  2001, 
http://www.arl.org/resources/pubs/mmproceedings/138guedon.shtml 
7See  for  instance  the  OECD  report  Working  Party  on  the  Information  Economy,  Digital  
Broadband  Content:  Scientific  Publishing,  2004, 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/42/12/35393145.pdf, 
price.8 While the Web is giving us the opportunity to disseminate science, the 
current scholarly publishing is still attempting to enclose our works within the 
barbed wire of a proprietary system that is justified only from the point of view 
of the publishers.9 
This  paper will  follow a backward itinerary  in  the Enlightenment debate on 
copyright,  from  Fichte's  1793  article10 Beweis  der  Unrechtmäßigkeit  des 
Büchernachdrucks, to Lessing's unpublished essay  Leben und leben lassen.11 
The Enlightenment thinkers, while lacking our powerful communication media, 
share with our age both the endeavor towards knowledge dissemination and 
the  challenge  of  a  copy-friendly  environment.  Dealing  with  them  may  be 
revolutionary,  both  in  an  astronomical  and  in  a  political  meaning:  going 
backwards,  before  the  age  of  intellectual  privilege,  might  help  us  to  go 
forwards,  to rediscover in a stronger way -  as human beings, as scholars – 
something that seemed lost.
1. A backward journey across the Enlightenment
During the 18th century, while the literary market was expanding beyond the 
professional readers,12 the  concept of intellectual property was hardly obvious. 
In  the early  modernity,  texts were conceived not  as things,  but  as actions. 
Printing was regulated by privileges13 granted by the Crown. There was a strong 
connection of interests between the printers guild and the government: the 
former  took  advantage  from their  monopoly  positions  and  the  latter  could 
enforce censorship in an easy way. Privileges used to be perpetual in time, but 
limited within the borders of the realm of the king who granted them.14 Beyond 
those borders, reprinting a privileged book was easy and - apparently – legal, 
above all in countries that, while speaking the same language, were divided in 
more than one state.15
8J.-C. Guédon,  In Oldenburg’s Long Shadow: Librarians, Research Scientists, Publishers, and  
the  Control  of  Scientific  Publishing, ARL  Publication,  2001, 
http://www.arl.org/resources/pubs/mmproceedings/138guedon.shtml 
9I am borrowing this expression from P. Aigrain, Cause commune. L'information entre bien 
commun et propriété, Paris, Fayard, 2005, p. 216, http://paigrain.debatpublic.net/?
page_id=160/  .
10J.G. Fichte, "Beweis der Unrechtmäßigkeit des Büchernachdrucks. Ein Räsonnement und eine 
Parabel", "Berlinische Monatsschrift", Mai 1793, pp.  443-482 
http://bfp.sp.unipi.it/hj/editing/showResourcePopUp.php?id=60&download=0 .
11G.E.  Lessing,  Leben  und  leben  lassen.  Ein  Projekt  für  Schriftsteller  und  Buchhändler, in 
Gotthold  Ephraim  Lessing,  Werke.  Hanser  Verlag,  München,  1970,  pp.  784-787, 
http://archiviomarini.sp.unipi.it/140/ 
12J.A.  McCarthy,  “Literatur  als  Eigentum:  Urheberrechtliche  Aspekte  der 
Buchhandelsrevolution”. MLN, 104 (3), 1989, pp. 531-547, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2905045.
13The major difference between copyright and privilege is that the former is a universal right, 
while the latter depends on a grant from the Crown. The former, in other words, is due to every 
author, while the latter derives from a decision of the political power.
14M. Rose, "Nine-tenths of the Law: the English Copyright Debates and the Rhetoric of the 
Public  Domain",  Law  and  Contemporary  Problems.  2003;  (66):75-87.  Available  from: 
http://www.law.duke.edu/shell/cite.pl?66+Law+\&\#38;+Contemp.+Probs.+75+
(WinterSpring+2003).
15In the German states, during the 18th century “Even its most vehement enemies called pirate 
editions as justifiable when the original publisher’s prices were increased, their discounts were 
low, codes of conduct were broken, colleagues as well as the public were damaged, or if pirate 
editions  were  only  distributed  in  regions  where  the  original  itself  was  not  available.  ”  R. 
Wittman,  Highwaymen or Heroes of Enlightenment? Viennese and South German Pirates and  
the German Market, paper presented at the conference “The History of Books and Intellectual 
History”,  Princeton,  2004,  p.  6, 
In 1710 the United Kingdom passed the Statute of Anne, the first European 
copyright law. The Statute copyright was no longer a grant from the crown: it 
was recognized as an original right of the author. It was limited in time, with a 
21 years term for all works already in print at the time of its enactment and a 
14 years  term for  all  works  published subsequently.16 However,  the Statute 
received a definitive judicial interpretation only in the 1774 trial Donaldson vs. 
Beckett, as the House of Lords upheld its limited terms and rejected the English 
booksellers'  claims,  according  to  which  copyright  had  to  be  a  (perpetual) 
common law property. “After 1774, the public domain was born. For the first 
time in Anglo-American [modern] history, the legal control over creative works 
expired,  and  the  greatest  works  in  English  history  -  including  those  of 
Shakespeare,  Bacon,  Milton,  Johnson,  and  Bunyan  -  were  free  of  legal 
restraint.”17
During  the  18th century,  while  the  battle  of  the  booksellers  was  raging  in 
England, the continental Europe maintained the early modern privilege regime. 
For instance, the king of France Louis XVI, in a 6.9.1776 letter, justified it as a 
“grâce fondée en justice“:18 it was fair to give authors the opportunity to earn 
an income from their works, but such an opportunity had to be based only on a 
gracious grant from the Crown, not on a right. In Germany, the multitude and 
fragmentation  of  states  and  jurisdictions  facilitated  the  “reprint”  of  books 
(Nachdruck), even against the will of authors and privileged publishers.
Furthermore, a strong Roman law tradition opposed the idea that immaterial 
entities could be owned. According to such a tradition, property is only possible 
on  touchable  things  (res  quae  tangi  possunt),19 which  are  excludable  and 
rivalrous and therefore present us with the question of who is entitled to use 
them. But,  besides  them, there  are entities  that  are common in  their  very 
nature.  As Lord Camden declared during the mentioned 1774 trial: “Science 
and learning are in their nature publici juris, and they ought to be as free and 
general as air or water”.20 
The English  copyright  experience and the rising importance of  independent 
authors and of book trade stimulated a lively discussion among Enlightenment 
thinkers  like  Diderot,  Condorcet,  Lessing,  Klopstock,  J.A.H.  Reimarus,  and 
Immanuel Kant himself. 
Nowadays, copyright is challenged because the Internet and the digitizing of 
texts make it easy to copy and to distribute them. From a technical point of 
view, such a challenge is undermining the publishers position, because authors 
can access directly the media and texts can circulate without being printed. As, 
http://www.princeton.edu/csb/conferences/december_2004/papers/Wittman_Paper.doc.
16The text of the Statute of Anne can be seen in K.-E. Tallmo,  The History of Copyright: A 
Critical  Overview  With  Source  Texts  in  Five  Languages  at 
http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html 
17L. Lessig, Free culture, The Penguin Books, New York,  2003, p.  93.
18M.-C. Dock, Étude sur le droit d’auteur, Librairie générale de droit et de jurisprudence, Paris, 
1963, p. 123
19For instance, on the basis of the  Roman Law tradition, the law faculty of Leipzig stated in 
1665 that the property of the publisher on a purchased manuscript is only a ius reale on it as a 
material thing. Later, in 1722. the law faculty of Jena declared that the paternity of a text gave 
the author or his delegate neither a property right on its printed copies nor the right to forbid 
its Nachdruck.  See John A. McCarthy, 1989, Literatur als Eigentum: Urheberrechtliche Aspekte 
der Buchhandelsrevolution, MLN, 104,  3: 531-547, pp. 536-537.
20See  Donaldson v. Beckett, Proceedings in the Lords on the Question of Literary Property,  
February 4 through February 22, 1774  http://www.copyrighthistory.com/donaldson.html 
in  the field of  humanities,  authors reputation is  usually  linked to publishers 
fame, such a shift proposes again the question of research evaluation as well.
Besides, in a digitized world, as reading a text implies copying it on one's hard 
disk, the connection between copying a book and “pirating” it is weakening. 
Like in the 18th century, we have to deal with a growing media technology that 
is challenging the current legislation. The major Enlightenment thinkers were 
aware - as authors - of the connection between the limitation of the freedom to 
copy and the social and philosophical meaning of their knowledge work and did 
not consider copyright as a technicality.  A backward look to the 18 th century 
could help us, as authors, to regain a new – and ancient - awareness. 
2. Fichte: the birth of a commonplace
In 1793 the “Berlinische Monatschrift” published a short essay,  Proof of the 
Illegality of Reprinting: A Reasoning and a Parable,21 written by Fichte two years 
ago. The essay connected originality to intellectual property and advocated the 
enforcing of the latter by means of criminal sanctions. It is worth mentioning 
the final  parable by means of  which Fichte illustrates his  thesis,  because it 
sports all our commonplaces on intellectual property.
In  the time of  the Caliph Harun al  Rashid,  an alchemist  used to prepare a 
beneficial  drug  and  to  entrust  the  commercial  side  of  the  business  to  a 
merchant who was the sole distributor throughout the land and who earned a 
goodly profit by his monopoly. Another medicine merchant stole the drug from 
the monopolist and started to sell it at a cheaper price. The latter brought him 
before the Caliph. The former pleaded for his case by arguing that his selling 
the drug for a cheaper price was useful to the sick persons and to the society 
at  large.  What  was  the  judgment  of  the  Caliph?  “He  had  the  useful  man 
hanged.”22  
To be accurate, the medicine merchant of the parable had not copied the drug, 
but had materially stolen it.  Fichte suggested that copying is like stealing. In 
the  18th century,  however,  Fichte  had to  demonstrate  the  commonplace  of 
today.
According to Fichte, we can distinguish two aspects of a book:
- its physical aspect (das körperliche), i.e. the printed paper
- its ideational aspect (das geistige)
The ideational aspect of a book is in turn divisible into:
- a material aspect, i.e. the ideas the book presents; 
- the form of these ideas, i. e. the way in which they are presented.
All the aspects of a book, except one, can be appropriated by anybody: we can 
buy the printed paper and assimilate the ideas it conveys. We cannot, however, 
appropriate its form, because it is strictly personal. And, according to Fichte, it 
is self-evident that "we are the rightful owners of a thing, the appropriation of 
which by another is physically impossible".23 As the form can be only mine, the 
author  is  the  proprietor  of  his  text  and  his  authorized  publisher  is  its 
21An  English  translation  by  Martha  Woodmansee  can  be  downloaded  at  the  URL 
http://www.case.edu/affil/sce/authorship/Fichte,_Proof.doc .
22 J.G. Fichte, Beweis, p. 482.
23 J.G. Fichte, Beweis, pp. 446 ff.
usufructuary. 
Originality  implies  property.  But  is  it  really  so  obvious?  Property  is  a 
comfortable social convention that allows us to avoid to quarrel all the time 
over  the  use  of  material  objects.  It  is  so  comfortable  just  because  it  is 
physically  possible  to  appropriate  things;  we  do  not  need  to  use  it  when 
something cannot be separated from someone.  I say both that my fingerprints 
or my writing style are "mine" and that my bicycle is "mine". But these two 
"mine" have a different meaning: the former is the "mine" of attribution; the 
latter is the "mine" of property.  The former can be used to identify someone; 
and conveys the historical circumstance that something is related exclusively 
to someone, the latter points only to an accidental relation with an external 
thing. On a historical circumstance it is possible to lie, by plagiarizing a text, 
i.e. by attributing it to a person who did not write it; but, properly speaking, no 
one  can  steal  it:  the  convention  of  property  is  useless,  in  this  case.  The 
reproduction of my fingerprints does not undermine their “originality”. Likewise, 
Friedemann  Kawohl  and  Martin  Kretschmer  have  recently  found  Fichte's 
argument flawed just  because it  mixes up something that  cannot  be taken 
away  by  others  –  and  does  not  need  to  be  protected  by  property  -  with 
something that can.
At the heart of Fichte’s approach to copyright infringement is a paradox. The 
illegitimate copyist takes something that, according to Fichte’s theory, cannot be 
taken.  On  the  one  hand,  ‘form’  is  a  fluid  concept  of  communication  and 
perception;  on the other hand,  ‘form’ is  an intrinsic  quality of  the book as a 
commodity: the former is inalienable expression; the latter is property.24
However sophistical this shift from originality to property may be, it is not the 
only seminal element of our commonplaces on copyright contained in Fichte's 
essay.  It  is  also  worth  remarking  that  in  the  Harun  al  Rashid  parable  the 
alchemist - the author - transfers his rights and disappears from the scene; the 
most powerful interests are these of a monopolist - the publisher -; only the 
other medicine merchant - the pirate - pleads for the interests of the public, but 
his  arguments  are  rejected  as  criminal;  as  regards  as  the  Caliph  -  the 
government -,  he bows to the monopolist's interests without saying a word; 
and, last but not least, the criminal sanction for piracy - capital punishment - is 
out of all proportion. 
Nowadays, all these features sound very familiar. But we need only to move 
one step backwards,  to realize how mistaken is  the belief  that copyright  is 
based on an obvious, intuitive idea.
3.  The  pirate  from  Koenigsberg:  Kant  and  the  Roman  Law 
tradition
Before  Fichte,  Kant  wrote  on  authors'  right  in  the  short  essay  Von  der 
Unrechtmäßigkeit  des  Büchernachdrucks  (1785)25 and reiterated  almost  the 
24F. Kawohl, M. Kretschmer, “Johann Gottlieb Fichte, and the Trap of Inhalt (Content) and Form: 
an Information Perspective on Music Copyright”, Information, Communication & Society, 12 (2), 
2009,  205-228.  The  quotation  is  from  p.  17  of  the  open  access  version  at  the  url 
http://eprints.bournemouth.ac.uk/9252/. 
25The  Cambridge  University  site  Primary  Sources  on  copyright (1450-1900) 
<http://www.copyrighthistory.org/htdocs/index.html> translates it, very accurately, as  On the 
Unlawfulness  of  Reprinting.  Besides,  the  commentary  on it,  written by  Friedemann Kawohl 
(Commentary on Kant's essay On the Injustice of Reprinting Books (1785)', in Primary Sources 
on Copyright (1450-1900), eds L. Bently & M. Kretschmer, www.copyrighthistory.org)  offers a 
same topics in  Die Metaphysik der Sitten,  Rechtslehre § 31, II1 (1797). Fichte 
believed  that  his  ideas  on  copyright  followed  Kant's  footprints.  There  is, 
however,  a  remarkable  difference  between  them.  While  Fichte  bases  the 
illegality of reprinting on a concept of intellectual property, Kant endorses the 
Roman Law tradition and does not apply the concept of property to written 
texts, as it is clearly stated in the 1785 essay conclusion.
If the idea of book publishing as such which was taken as the basis for the above 
arguments were to be understood properly and (as I  flatter myself  to think it 
feasible) if it were to be elaborated with the requisite elegance of Roman juridical 
scholarship, then actions against reprinters could very well be brought before the 
courts  without  it  being  necessary  to  apply  beforehand  for  a  new  law  to  be 
promulgated in this respect.26
According to Kant, a book can be seen: 
- as a material object (1) 
- as a means of conveying thoughts (2) 
- as a speech (3)
1. The book as a material object may be reprinted. It becomes a property of 
whoever buys it.  For  the very principle  of  private property,  it  is  not  fair  to 
restrain the ways in which its  legitimate purchaser may use it  (VUB,  AA.08 
79:10-13).
2. The Nachdruck does not prevent anyone to keep on conceiving his thoughts. 
They  remain  a  "property"  of  their  author,  regardless  of  their  reproduction, 
because  they  are  not  material:  properly  speaking,  ideas  cannot  be  stolen 
(AA.08 79:08-10). 
3. A speech is an action (Handlung) (AA.08 85-86). A person who is speaking to 
a public  is  not selling anything to them: he is  engaging a relationship with 
them. Therefore, such a relation is not a matter of rights on things ( iura realia), 
but of personal rights (iura personalia).
In the Metaphysik der Sitten, the ius reale or ius in re is a right on things;27 the 
ius personale is the "possession of another's choice [Willkür], in the sense of 
my capacity to determine it by my own choice to a certain deed”.28 In other 
words, it  is  a right entitling someone to obtain acts from other persons. As 
moral  subjectivity  involves  freedom,  personal  rights  cannot  be  established 
without the concerned persons' consent. 
According  to  Kant,  the  ius  reale cannot  be  applied  to  ideas,  or,  better,  to 
thoughts,  because  they  can  be  conceived  by  everyone  at  the  same  time, 
without  depriving  their  authors.  Surprising  as  it  may  seem,  the ius  reale 
protects  the  freedom to  copy,  if  it  is  taken seriously.   If  a  thing has  been 
remarkably faithful  interpretation of Kant's ideas on copyright:  “Kant denies the concept of 
"intellectual property" and the idea that any intellectual content is materialised in the book as 
such. In Kant's view the book is a medium, a mere tool for conveying the author's thoughts, 
and thus an unlicensed reprint does not encroach on any property as such of the author or 
publisher. Rather, it is unlawful because it amounts to an "agency without authority".”
26I Kant,  Von der Unrechtmäßigkeit des Büchernachdrucks, AA.8, 87:09-14. The translation is 
by Luis Sundkvist, adapted from John Richardson's anonymous translation of 1799, now in the 
Cambridge University site Primary Sources on copyright (1450-1900) quoted above.
27 §11, MS, AA.06 260. The English translations from the Metaphysik der Sitten are by M. Gregor: I. Kant, 
The Metaphysics of Morals, Cambridge, Cambridge U.P., 1996. 
28 §18,  MS,  AA.06 271:04-10.  According  to  R.  Pozzo  (“Immanuel  Kant  on  intellectual  property”. 
Trans/Form/Ação 29 (2), 2006) Kant's copyright belongs to the family of personal rights, in the current 
meaning of rights  http://www.thefreedictionary.com/Personal+rights pertaining to the person, like the 
rights of a personal security, personal liberty, and private property. Such an interpretation contrasts 
with the definition of ius personale contained in the Metaphysik der Sitten and gives the readers the 
misleading impression that Kant intended copyright as a basic human right. 
purchased  in  a  legal  transaction  and  the  purchasers  copy  it  by  their  own 
means, they are working on their legitimate property.  For the very principle of 
private  property,  it  is  not  fair  to  restrain  the  ways  in  which  its  legitimate 
purchaser may use it. 
For this reason, no ius reale can be opposed to the reprinter. If we see the book 
as a material thing, whoever buys it has the right to reproduce it: after all, it is 
his book. Furthermore, in Kant's opinion, no affirmative personal obligation can 
derive from a ius reale (VUB, AA.08 83.), because a ius personale on someone 
cannot  be claimed by purchasing some related things without  obtaining his 
expressed consent.
Therefore,  Kant  cannot  be  included  among  the  intellectual  property 
forerunners.  In his perspective, on the one hand, no ius reale can be opposed 
to the reprinter's claim, and, on the other hand, thoughts cannot be properly 
“stolen”. Knowledge is not a material object exposed to a competitive use.
Kant, by conceiving the book as an action, adopts a strategy based on the ius 
personale only., and concludes that the unauthorized printer is comparable to 
an  unauthorized  spokesperson  rather  than  to  a  thief.  Therefore,  to  protect 
authors from reprinters, it is not necessary to invent a ius reale on immaterial 
things.  Kant's argument sticks to Roman Law tradition: a person, by speaking 
to a public, engages a relationship with them. The book may be viewed as a 
medium through which he transmits his speech to a wider public. In the age of 
printing, such a  medium used to be provided by publishers. Thus publishers 
can be considered as spokespersons who speak in the name of the authors. 
And, as such, they need the authors' authorization (VUB, AA.08 79-82) to speak 
in  the name of  another without  his  authorization  is  like engaging him in  a 
relationship without his consent. As personal rights concern relations among 
free  beings,  they  can  arise  only  from  expressed  agreements.  Hence,  the 
unauthorized  printer  is  like  an unauthorized spokesperson,  who produces  a 
relation of the author with the public without being entitled to do it.
The scope of Kant's justification of copyright applies only to the publishing of 
texts, does not touch th so-called derivative works and it is justified only as far 
as it helps the public to get the texts.
Kant does not recognize works of art as speeches. He calls works of art Werke 
or opera, i.e. things that are produced, while indicating books as Handlungen or 
operae, i.e. actions. As the works of art are simply physical objects, we can 
derive from Kant's assumption that every legitimate purchaser may reproduce 
them and may donate or sell the copies to others (AA.08 85-86). Every time an 
object can be treated only as a product, its legitimate owner may do what he 
wants with it, because of his ius reale, which has to be taken seriously on both 
sides.   Moreover,  as  the  injustice  of  reprinting  books  depends  on  their 
communication  to  the  public,  we  can  deduce  that  their  reproduction  for 
personal use is not to be forbidden.
As regards as the derivative works, Kant states that, if one shortens, augments, 
retouches  or  translates  the  book  of  another,  he  produces  a  new  speech, 
although the thoughts can be the same. Therefore, derivative works cannot be 
seen  as  Nachdruck and  are  perfectly  lawful  (AA.08  86-87).  In  a  Kantian 
environment, everyone may become a “wreader” - a reader and writer at the 
same time - without being hindered by copyright restrictions
The goal of the transaction between the author and the publisher is conveying 
his text to the public. The public has a right to interact with the author, if the 
latter has chosen to do it. According to Kant, the publisher may neither refuse 
to publish – or to hand over to another publisher, if he does not want to do it 
himself – a text of a dead author, nor release mutilated or spurious works, nor 
print only a limited impression that does not meet the demand. If the publisher 
does not comply, the public has the right to force him to publish (AA.08 85). In 
a Kantian environment the publisher's rights are justified only when they help 
authors  to  reach  the  public.  Copyright  should  be  neither  censorship  nor 
monopoly.
In the 1785 essay Kant stated that the mandate of an author to a publisher 
should  be  exclusive  (AA.08  81)  because  the  publisher  becomes  willing  to 
publish a book only if he is certain to earn something from it; therefore, he is 
interested in avoiding competition.   But later,  in the  Metaphysik der Sitten, 
Kant does not mention the exclusivity requirement at all, perhaps because he 
has realized that it was based on an empirical contamination, depending on the 
current state of technology. 
In Kant's world the press used to be the medium that provided for the widest 
distribution  of  ideas.  Printing  required  both  specific  tools  and  skills,  and 
specialized  and  centralized  organizations.  And as  long  as  the  publishers  of 
printed texts provided the only medium to convey speeches to a wide public, 
Kant was inclined to bow to their interest. 
However, from a conceptual perspective, there is no reason to deny that an 
author  should  be  entitled  to  authorize  everyone  to  distribute  his  work  to 
everyone else, just like a person may hire more than one spokesperson. As it is 
now fairly usual on the Internet, authors choose a Creative Commons License 
and  grant  the  right  to  publish  their  works  to  everyone,  because  they  are 
interested in the widest possible spreading of their ideas. In Kant's times such a 
strategy would hardly be paying because the major publication technology, the 
press, was not cheap and easy like the digital reproduction of texts, but difficult 
and expensive. 
Kant's thesis is based on the technical assumption that publishing requires an 
intermediation - just as it used to be in the age of print -, which is lawful only it 
has  the  author's  consent.  Where  the  intermediation  is  not  necessary  any 
longer, where no one is speaking in the name of another, copyright makes no 
sense.29
There are at least three outstanding differences between Kant and Fichte:
1. Fichte  bases  copyright  on  the  individual  originality  in  the  form  of 
expression; Kant does not mention originality at all;
2. Fichte  equates  copyright  with  private  property; Kant  rejects  the  very 
possibility of founding the authors' right on a ius reale;
3. Fichte  believes  that  copyright  violators  deserve  the  same  harsh 
punishment  of  thieves.  According  to  Kant,  the  unauthorized  printer 
should simply compensate all the damages he caused to the author or to 
his authorized publisher.
While  Fichte  is  an  intellectual  property  endorser,  Kant  is  an  “enlightened” 
conservative who supports the Roman law tradition, against the propertization 
trend.30 He  accepts  the  copyright  principle,  according  to  which  authors  are 
29In a Kantian environment, sites like  The Pirate Bay, as they are only facilitating people to 
copy materials for their personal use, should not be seen as a "pirate" Nachdrucker.
30In  Freedom, Ownership and Copyright: Why Does Kant Reject the Concept of Intellectual  
Property?,  Società italiana di filosofia politica, 2010,  http://www.sifp.it/pdf/kantpisa.pdf, §4, I 
widen the scope of the argument by showing that Kant's ideas on copyright can be connected 
to his general theory of the scope of property.
entitled  to  decide  how to publish  their  works.  The rights  of  the publishers, 
however, are justified only as long as they help authors to reach the public, 
while the personal use of the texts and the so-called “wreading” should be free. 
And, above all, all that can be viewed as a product is, in his opinion, outside the 
scope of copyright and may be copied without restrictions. In a nutshell: Kant 
suggests  an  argument  for  authors'  moral  rights  without  sacrificing 
Enlightenment. 
4.  G.E.  Lessing:  authors  and  publishers  in  a  copy-friendly  
environment
If we eliminate, with Kant, the concept of property from the realm of creative 
works, we can see copyright only from the perspective of a relationship among 
persons.  Therefore,  we become able to take seriously  not only authors and 
their  publishers,  but  also  the public  at  large.  Kant's  copyright  has  the only 
function to protect authors' freedom to share their texts as they prefer, and to 
make it easier to communicate them to the public. But, if copyright is only a 
means to foster the publication and the diffusion of texts, its rules should also 
be connected with the prevailing media technology. We should become aware 
that copying a text to read it in the Internet age is not the same as reprinting a 
book to sell its copies in the age of printing.31 
How can authors get an income in a copy friendly environment? About ten 
years before Kant, Lessing had proposed an answer to such a question, in his 
unpublished fragment Leben und leben lassen.  
In  the  18th century,  the  political  fragmentation  of  Germany  made  the 
Nachdruck of  privileged  books  very  easy.  In  this  game,  authors  were  the 
weaker players: after having sold their manuscripts at low prices, they did not 
share any further profit with publishers and reprinters. Lessing, who was trying 
to  live  on  his  work,  without  depending  on  patronage,  advocated,  on  their 
behalf, a peculiar, far-sighted solution. 
First of all, Lessing tried to give his work an economic meaning, by applying to 
it  Locke's  justification  of  property.  Everyone is  entitled to be the legitimate 
owner of all that has come into being by means of one's work. Such a thesis 
had been proposed also by Diderot,32 to argue in favor of a perpetual copyright. 
However Lessing, unlike Diderot, realized that such a claim is partly rhetorical: 
when a book has been published, it can be copied. It is impossible to enclose 
an  immaterial  thing.  Moreover,  why  should  authors  defend  copyright  in  a 
situation  in  which  most  of  the  profit  from their  creative work  is  earned by 
publishers?  From  the  authors'  perspective,  the  core  question  has  to  be 
reformulated as  follows:  how can authors  get  an  income in  a  copy-friendly 
environment and in a publishing system in which publishers hardly share their 
earnings with them? The rights of the authors as workers are not the same as 
authors right as intended by the publishers. 
Lessing suggested a system of print on demand in which earnings were equally 
shared among printers, authors and publishers, supported by a free circulation 
31On this difference, it is still worth reading Richard Stallman's dystopian tale “The Right to 
Read”,  Communications  of  the  ACM,  40,   2,  1997,  http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/right-to-
read.html. 
32D.  Diderot,  Lettre  sur  le  commerce  de  la  librairie  (1764), 
http://www.freescape.eu.org/biblio/article.php3?id_article=145 
of previews. In such a system, only books really required by the public would 
deserve to be printed and the Nachdruck would not undermine the earnings of 
the first publishers, because it could happen only later. To quote Kevin Kelly: 
“When copies are free, you need to sell things which cannot be copied”33. 
To  be  accomplished,  Lessing's  project  would  have  need  a  wide  and  cheap 
circulation  of  information,  which  was  not  possible  in  the  age  of  printing. 
Nowadays,  however,  we  can  both  emancipate  authors  from publishers  and 
cooperate with them, in a free information environment, by selling things that 
cannot  be  copied.  The  subscription  printing  is  only  an  opportunity  among 
others.34
5. Apostles and scholars: the “noble Luther”
In  his  attempt  to  justify  authors'  right  to  be  paid  for  their  work,  Lessing 
criticized Martin Luther for his evangelical “it was freely that I received and 
freely  that  I  gave  it”35,  paraphrased  in  his  Warning  to  the  Printers36 that 
introduced  his  Bible  translation  published  in  1541.  The  “freely  ye  have 
received, freely give” of the Gospel of Matthew belongs to a set of instructions 
given by Jesus to his apostles before sending them in the world. Luther does 
not  conceive  his  translation  as  a  business  enterprise,  but  as  an  apostolic 
mission. The translator is the means of a word that transcends him, within a 
community of knowledge ideally founded by and in Christ himself.   
The  Reformation  saw  the  first  large  scale  media  campaign,  in  which  the 
evangelic party was able to use in a way both consistent and efficacious all the 
communication  opportunities  provided  by  the  recent  Gutenberg  invention.37 
Luther encouraged laymen to access the Holy Scriptures and the faith in an 
autonomous  way,  without  depending  any  longer  on  the  mediation  of  the 
Roman-Catholic  authority.  He  encouraged  them,  in  other  words,  to  break 
themselves free from a hierarchical community of knowledge, built upon the 
scarcity of texts and the monopoly of their interpretation, to be Christian in an 
immediate way. Without the printing press, Luther's German translation of the 
Bible  and the booklets  advocating his  ideas would  have never reached the 
wider  public  of  laymen whose religious  dignity  he  theorized.  In  a  way,  the 
medium was the message as well.
The very success of Luther resulted in several unauthorized reprints of his Bible 
translations,  sometimes  heavily  modified  by  his  Roman-Catholic  opponents. 
The  Warning to the Printers contains Luther's self-defense. Its arguments are 
very different from an – anachronistic – advocacy of intellectual privilege: 
Therefore, if someone wishes to acquire our newly revised version of the Bible for 
33K. Kelly, Better than free, 2008 
http://www.kk.org/thetechnium/archives/2008/01/better_than_fre.php 
34D. Baker ("The reform of intellectual property", Post-Autistic Economic Review, 5 (32), 2005 
http://www.paecon.net/PAEReview/development/Baker32.htm) suggests to replace copyright – a 
government granted monopoly that does not belong to market economy - with a distributed 
patronage, for instance by deducting contributions to arts and sciences from taxable income, or 
by establishing a system of individual vouchers.
35Mt. 10.8: “freely ye have received, freely give”.
36 Luther's "Warning to the Printers", Wittenberg (1541) is now included in Primary sources on 
copyright,  http://www.copyrighthistory.org/cgi-bin/kleioc/0010/exec/showthumb/
%22d_1541_im_001_0002.jpg%22#. 
37M.U. Edwards, Printing, Propaganda, and Martin Luther. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University 
of California Press, 1994
himself or for a library, I hereby honestly warn him that he should pay attention 
to what and where he is buying and that he should try to buy this version only 
which was published here this year (1541).  For I'm not counting on living so long 
/ that I would be able to go through the Bible a second time. And even if I were to 
live as long as this would take I am fast becoming too weak for such work.38
If, against the Roman-Catholic hierarchy, the right and the duty to evaluate the 
Scriptures belong to the readers, they are as well in the condition to appreciate 
the difference between the Bible edition elaborated by Luther himself and the 
careless, hasty reprints published for the sake of money. Luther does not claim 
himself trustworthy because of his creativity and ingenuity. He presents himself 
as an “unworthy, wretched, poor instrument”: his merit depends only on his 
participation in Christ, or, in more secular words, in a community of knowledge 
from which he has received freely before freely giving it his contribute.  
Why could Luther afford to be “nobler” than Lessing and neglect the economic 
facets of books writing and publishing? Luther, while using the printing press to 
spread  the  word  of  his  Reformation,  could  still  rely  on  the  heritage  of  a 
community of  knowledge – the ideal  church to which all  Christians virtually 
belong because they are one with Christ - in which both writers and readers 
were  not  alone  before  their  books.  Luther  was  still  keeping  a  foot  in   the 
premodern  world,  which  conceived  knowledge  as  a  collective  enterprise, 
beyond individuality and  ownership. 39
Only two centuries later, the power of the publishing system had become so 
strong  that  Lessing's  appeal  to  the  public  to  emancipate  authors  from the 
publishers  grip  remained  of  theoretical  concern  only.  The  very  system that 
made it possible Luther's appeal to his readers created, both because of its 
costs and its technical proclivity to intellectual privilege and censorship, a new 
kind of mediation – and new kinds of oligopolies.
6. Back to the future: Plato's academy and the web
According to Plato, the technical possibility of a mediation overpowering the 
communities of knowledge was introduced by the very invention of writing. 
In  a  well-known  Phaedrus myth,  the  Egyptian  god  Theuth,  inventor  of  the 
letters  (grammata)  presents  his  invention  to  the  pharaoh  Thamus with  the 
following words:
This invention, o king, will make the Egyptians more sapient and will  improve 
their memories; for it is drug (pharmakon) of memory and sapience that I have 
discovered.”  But  Thamus  replied,  “Most  ingenious  Theuth,  one  man  has  the 
ability to beget arts, but the ability to judge of their usefulness or harmfulness to 
their users belongs to another; and now you, who are the father of letters, have 
been led by your affection to ascribe to them a power the opposite of that which 
they really possess. For this invention will produce forgetfulness in the minds of 
those  who  learn,  because  they  will  not  practice  their  memory.  Their  trust  in 
writing, produced by external characters which are no part of themselves, will 
discourage the use of their own memory within them. You have invented a drug 
not  of  memory (mneme),  but  of  reminding (hypòmnesis);  and you offer  your 
pupils the appearance of sapience, not true sapience, for they will read many 
things without instruction and will therefore seem to know many things, when 
they are for the most part ignorant and hard to get along with (syneinai), since 
they are not sapient,  but only appear sapient (doxosophoi).  (Phaedrus,  274e-
38 Luther's "Warning to the Printers" (see above).
39C. Hesse,  “The rise of intellectual property, 700 b.c.–a.d. 2000: an idea in the balance”, 
Daedalus, 2002 (Spring), p. 34, http://www.amacad.org/publications/spring2002/hesse.pdf)..
275a)
Writing is a  pharmakon,  an equivocal Greek word meaning both “drug” and 
“poison”, because it can produce both good and bad effects:
• it  facilitates  the  reminding  (hypòmnesis),  that  is  the  preservation  and 
transmission of information;
• the abundance of information does not enhance, by itself, the users' memory 
and sapience, or their personal ability to recall  the proper notion when it is 
needed and to evaluate and connect mnemonic data;
• as  information  provided  by  writing  depends  on  external  devices,  not  on 
personal and interpersonal conditions, the staying together that supported oral 
cultures  and  ancient  philosophical  schools  (synousia)  becomes  difficult: 
cooperation is replaced by competition.
According to Plato, we have knowledge only if the knowing subject can handle 
notions in a critical way and interlink them,40 and is able to discuss them with 
others. If an idea is only for someone, it cannot be an idea for everyone; but if 
an idea is not for everyone, it is not knowledge. Writing produces the delusion 
the life of knowledge can be transferred to objects that can be owned, bought 
and  sold.  But  the  actual  knowledge  is  something  different:  the  information 
abundance caused by writing does not imply, in itself, the ability to control our 
notions in a critical way. We have to learn to use grammata being aware both of 
their potentialities and of their limitations. According to Socrates, grammata do 
not  produce  anything  clear  and  certain.  The  only  use  of  written  words  is 
“reminding  (hypomnesai)  him who knows the  matter  about  which  they  are 
written” (Phaedrus, 275d).
To understand the meaning of hypomnesis, as the writing proper purpose, we 
should  use  as  term  of  comparison  the  anamnesis of  Phaedrus 249b-d. 
Anamnesis – literally,  a remembering “from above” (anà) -  is  understanding 
“according to what is called eidos, by going forward from manifold sensations 
to the unit  collected together by means of  reasoning”.  On the other  hand, 
hypomnesis -  literally,  a  remembering  “from  below”  is  the  bare  ability  of 
preserving  information.  In  other  words,  knowledge  is  composed  by  two 
elements:
• a bunch of information data that can be preserved and conveyed in various 
ways, object of hypomnesis;
• their systematic interconnection, in a unitary and consistent meaning.
In  both  levels,  memory  (mneme)  plays  a  role.  From Plato's  point  of  view, 
knowledge can exist only in relation to a collective endowment, which is not 
created  by  single  individuals,  but  only  reconstructed  by  them.  To  get 
knowledge, we need information; but we should also be able to understand it, 
that is to explain, select and evaluate it. Written texts can give us hypomnesis 
and information data; but to obtain knowledge we need people to discuss with. 
An idea becomes an idea only if it is not private, but can be thought and shared 
40In Plato's Meno  (98a) Socrates states that science consists in bonding. In Plato, these bonds 
are not associations, but causal reasonings: in his dialogs, however, myths are used as nodes 
of  a  web  of  associations  (see  for  instance  the  affinity  between  the  Meno's  account   of 
Daedalian  statues  and  the  similar  account  of  Euthyphro:  M.L.  McPherran,  The  Aporetic 
Interlude and Fifth Elenchus of Plato's Euthyphro, p. 14, in D. Sedley ed.  Oxford Studies in 
Ancient Philosophy, Volume XXV: Oxford U.P.,Winter 2003.
by everyone. Information becomes knowledge only if it passes the examination 
of sharing.
Writing,  Phaedrus,  has  this  terrible  quality,  and  is  very  like  painting;  for  the 
creatures of painting stand like living beings, but if one asks them a question, 
they preserve a solemn silence. And so it is with speeches; you might think they 
spoke as if they had intelligence, but if you question them, wishing to know about 
their sayings, they always say only one and the same thing. And every word, 
when once it is written, is bandied about, alike among those who understand and 
those who have no interest in it, and it knows not to whom to speak or not to 
speak; when ill-treated or unjustly reviled it always needs its father to help it; for 
it has no power to protect or help itself. (275d-e)
A  written  text  –  just  every  kind  of  monologue41 -  cannot  go  beyond  the 
communication of bare data because it lacks interactivity. However, there is a 
further kind of speech, its “legitimate” brother. (Phaedrus, 276a) To understand 
the  meaning  of  such  a  metaphor,  we  should  recall  Phaedrus,  275d-e:  the 
written text is a son of the writer, but cannot resort to its kinship. When it is ill-
treated, its fathers' authority does not grow from the text, if he does not defend 
it  in person. For  this  reason, it  is  like an illegitimate,  unrecognized child.  A 
legitimate  child,  on  the  contrary,  enjoys  some  rights  from  its  father's 
legitimation, on the basis of its position in a chain of authority:
Socrates: [The speech] which is written with science in the soul of the learner, 
which is able to defend itself and knows to whom it should speak, and before 
whom to be silent.
Phaedrus: You mean the living and breathing speech of him who knows, of which 
the written one may justly be called the image (eidolon). (Phaedrus, 276a)
According to Socrates, a written text is ephemeral like the gardens of Adonis 
(Phaedrus, 276b).2 On the contrary, he who has knowledge of the just and the 
good
 ...will plant the gardens of letters for amusement, and will write, when he writes, 
to  treasure up reminders  (hypomnèmata)  for  himself,  when he comes to  the 
forgetfulness  (lethe)  of  old  age,  and  for  others  who  follow  the  same  path, 
(Phaedrus, 276d)
 ...but, in my opinion, seriousness is far nobler, when one employs the dialectic 
method (dialektiké techne) and, with science (episteme), plants and sows in a 
fitting soul speeches which are able to help themselves and him who planted 
them, which are not fruitless, but yield seed from which there spring up in other 
minds other words capable of continuing the process for ever, and which make 
their  possessor  happy,  to  the  farthest  possible  limit  of  human  happiness. 
(Phaedrus, 276e-277a)
Socrates believes in the potential immortality of the speeches that are “written 
in  the  soul”  and  considers  texts  as  passing,  even  if  they  can  admittedly 
preserve information.  According to Plato notions (object of  hypòmnesis)  can 
become knowledge only  by  means of  an interactive  and critical  processing 
among persons, which transcends individuality.42 Plato is silent about himself – 
the author – because he wants to emphasize that reason and research, as such, 
go across us all and beyond everyone of us.
Socrates' words and metaphors seem to suggest that the speeches “written in 
41In Protagoras 329a-b, Socrates refuses to listen to the Sophist's long speeches, by asserting 
that some speaker can certainly deliver long and beautiful speeches, but they – just like books -  
would not be able to answer to someone interrupting and questioning them.
42See L. Edelstein,“Platonic Anonymity”, The American Journal of Philology, 83 (1), 1962, pp. 1-
22 http://www.jstor.org/stable/291776
the soul” are more permanent in time as well. Stressing either the importance 
of  texts or  the role  of  speeches “written in  the soul”  leads,  indeed, to two 
different communication strategies.
Plato's criticism of writing has reached us by means of a written text, freely 
copied through the centuries. He has obviously chosen to write, but within the 
frame of a communication strategy in which writing is clearly subordinate.
If  Plato had adopted the text as a major or unique means to preserve and 
communicate knowledge, not bare information, he would have had to consider 
that «it is bandied about, alike among those who understand and those who 
have no interest in it [...] and has no power to protect itself» (Phaedrus, 275d-
e). To propagate a text in time and space, we need to copy it. However, if the 
writer leaves it  to itself,  it  is  easy mangling or altering it.  The only way to 
preserve its integrity is the control of its copy, even before that the invention of 
print and the interest of the state to censorship together with the stationers' 
pursuit of monopoly pave the way to copyright. Copy, however, is not only the 
vector of counterfeiting, but also a crucial medium to disseminate a text in 
time and space. Therefore, the control of copy will abridge the propagation of 
texts; there will be fewer copies and it will be easier a text gets lost for the 
wear  of  time.  Besides,  if  texts  have  a  smaller  circulation,  the  cultural 
community that knows them will be smaller as well. Thus, even if some texts 
succeeded in surviving, they risk to became unintelligible, because no one is 
able to understand them any longer.
Plato did choose to take seriously the task of writing in the soul: he worked for 
the creation of  a cultural community and treated text just like a mnemonic 
help, which can produce knowledge only if someone capable to follow its paths 
will read it attentively. In such a perspective, there is no reason to control the 
copy: our texts circulate freely, even if  they risk to get altered or forged. A 
community of persons lasts both by means of direct teaching and thanks to 
easily  accessible  texts,  while  yielding,  in  this  way,  a  continuity  in  cultural 
tradition. People are less long-lasting than many data storage supports; but the 
knowledge  communities,  composed  by  people,  let  information  remain 
knowledge. From a more earthbound perspective, people copy and rewrite the 
texts, and the redundancy they produce secures them against the wear of the 
time and the calamities of history.
Plato, thus, founded the Academy as seed of a knowledge community, and set 
free his writings in the quicksand of the ancient samizdat. The very fact we are 
still discussing on his thought after two millennia and a half shows that he was 
historically right.  The success of  GNU-Linux, which is  likewise founded on a 
users and developers community and on the freedom of the code, is  not a 
computer  science oddity.  All  the meaningful  cultural  experiences that  cross 
centuries and generations spread in a similar way.  We have now the tools to 
address and open communities of knowledge relying not only on face to face 
communication, but on an evolving, open and hyperlinked web of documents 
and data.43 
In 1969, Foucault's question “What is an author?”, which suggested that we 
could as well do away with such a concept, could seem brilliant, sophisticated 
and provocative. However, from the revolutionary point of view of both Plato 
43S. Harnad,  Back to the Oral Tradition Through Skywriting at the Speed of Thought, 2003, 
http://www.interdisciplines.org/defispublicationweb/papers/6.
and Tim Berners-Lee, the overcoming of authors in a public web of science44 is 
both a heritage from the past and a possibility for the future. 
We have always loved one another. We’re human. It’s something we’re good at. 
But up until  recently,  the radius and half-life of that affection has been quite 
limited. With love alone, you can plan a birthday party. Add coordinating tools 
and you can write an operating system. In the past, we would do little things for 
love, but big things required money. Now we can do big things for love.45 
 
44James Boyle (Mertonianism Unbound? Imagining Free, Decentralized Access to Most Cultural  
and Scientific Material,  in E. Ostrom, C. Hess, eds.,  Understanding knowledge as a commons,  
Cambridge Mass.-London,  The MIT Press,  2007,  pp.  123-143)  asks  himself  whether  we are 
underestimating the power of a lay audience, given free Internet access to cultural materials 
and  factual  data  as  well  as  scholarly  work,  to  add  richness  and  depth  to  the  world  of 
scholarship in the same way that they have in the world of the provision of factual information. 
45C.  Shirky,  Supernova  Talk:  The  Interned  runs  on  love, 2008 
http://www.shirky.com/herecomeseverybody/2008/02/supernova-talk-the-internet-runs-on-
love.html. 
